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The Antarctic Regime: An Introduction
BERNARD H. OXMAN*
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the Antarctic
Treaty.' While the absence of extensive debate regarding Antarctica
during most of the intervening period is due partly to the geographic
and functional remoteness of the continent from most of mankind,
it also reflects the success of the Antarctic Treaty and general rules
of international law in providing a peaceful and orderly basis for
governing man's activities in the region. The twelve states that
negotiated the Treaty' and that have administered it as
"Consultative Parties"3 may, and occasionally do, take pride in
their accomplishments.
Now the quiet interlude seems to be ending. Cacophony is but
one of the harmonic possibilities of the accelerating activity. The
result will depend upon a timely and proper identification of the
difficulties and the capacity to find solutions to these problems.
Recognizing the degree to which the former comprehends the latter,
the University of Miami Law Review has rightly chosen to devote
this symposium issue to expert appreciation of and sugestions con-
cerning the natural, political, ethical and economic factors bearing
upon Mr. Alexander's general legal survey, as well as Ms. Hook's
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. J.D., Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law, 1965; A.B., Columbia University, 1962; member, New York and Dis-
trict of Columbia Bars; United States Representative and Deputy Chief of Delegation, Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans,
Environment and Scientific Affairs, United States Department of State until September
1977. In his capacity as Assistant Legal Adviser, the author participated in preparations for
dealing with the legal aspects of Antarctic resource problems. The views herein, however, are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State or
the United States government.
1. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 42 U.N.T.S. 71, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780 [hereinafter cited as the Treaty]. The text of and the parties to the Treaty are set forth
in appendix A infra.
2. The original parties were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
3. Poland became the 13th Consultative Party at a Special Consultative Meeting held
between July 25 and 29, 1977. Handbook of Measures in Furtherance of the Principles and
Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty xiv (London, Sept. 16, 1977) (prepared for the Ninth
Consultative Meeting).
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specific inquiry regarding criminal jurisdiction.
Antarctica is the coldest, highest and windiest continent.' It is
inhospitable to most living creatures, yet is a fertile environment for
others. The harsh climate makes it-until now-the most unspoiled
area on earth. Human settlement, as commonly understood, or per-
haps even as understood in the context of a forbidding desert, has
not yet reached Antarctica. Its "stations" are more like ships at sea,
or perhaps the space stations of the next decade. Two classic Ant-
arctic epithets-"environmental preserve," "natural laboratory"-
are still valid today. Antarctica is a place for adventurous natura-
lists and for scientists, and for penguins.
The problem is not Antarctica itself, although it is true that
natural changes in Antarctica could effect major changes in the rest
of the world. With some ninety-five percent of the world's fresh
water captured as Antarctic ice, a significant increase in the melting
rate of that ice could inundate the coastal areas of the world. The
effect on weather conditions could be equally dramatic. Aside from
the direct life support for whales and other migratory species, the
relationship between the nutrient-rich Antarctic waters and the life-
cycle in other parts of the planet is not completely understood.' But
there is no indication that intervention by man is necessary to pre-
vent some natural disaster, to defend mankind from some inexhora-
ble and threatening process.
The problem is man, or more aptly, men. Increasing numbers
are going to or are interested in Antarctica. This is a political prob-
lem. Like other political problems, both the issues and the solutions
are frequently expressed in legal terms. The context in which this
problem arises is different, perhaps astonishingly different, from
the norm. Yet, for the most part, the issues are not new, nor are
they very different from the political and legal issues that men face
elsewhere. However, two unique questions are posed. First, are we
capable of finding solutions relevent to the unusual conditions in
Antarctica? Second, are we capable of finding better solutions in
principle than we have thus far devised for dealing with these prob-
lems elsewhere? These two questions can be regarded as the politi-
4. Dr. de Blij's article provides an illuminating description of the climate and geography
of the Antarctic. See de Blij, A Regional Geography of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean,
33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 299 (1978).
5. Dr. Llano's article discusses this matter as well as the interrelationship among species
in the Antarctic ecology. See Llano, The Ecology of the Southern Ocean Region, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 357 (1978).
6. Ms. Hook's comment presents a discussion of the increasing encroachment by man
in Antarctica and the jurisdictional difficulties regarding the maintenance of public order as
access to the continent improves. See Hook, Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 489 (1978).
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cal equivalents of the two classic Antarctic epithets: the first em-
phasizes Antarctica as a political preserve, while the second empha-
sizes Antarctica as a political laboratory.
Both tendencies find ample support in the current regime in
Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty, the result of an earlier "Spirit of
Camp David," demilitarized Antarctica.' It was the first arms con-
trol agreement of its kind since World War II. The effect was to
isolate Antarctica from the military rivalries between the West and
the Soviet bloc; the continent became a "preserve" in the arms race.
That Treaty was followed by similar efforts: to prevent the nuclear
arms race from extending to outer space and celestial bodies' or to
the seabeds;' to create a Latin American nuclear-free zone" and
perhaps an Indian Ocean "zone of peace";" and less directly to
prevent nuclear testing 2 and the proliferation of nuclear weapons,"
and to limit strategic arms." In this sense, Antarctica was a political
"laboratory" in efforts to control the arms race. The historic role of
the Antarctic Treaty as the first successful effort of its kind to regu-
late 'post-war rivalries (the first controlled experiment'in detente
or peaceful co-existence) gives it a symbolic significance that ought
not to be overlooked in assessing various political alternatives.
Like many constitutive instruments that work fairly well, the
Antarctic Treaty falls victim to the assumption that it was drafted
7. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
8. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Incuding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 610
U.N.T.S. 205, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as the Outer
Space Treaty].
9. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, done
Feb. 11, 1971, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [1972] 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
10. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 282, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 1838. See also Protocol II to the treaty,
634 U.N.T.S. 364, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137.
11. See Declaration Regarding an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, G.A. Res. 2832, 26 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 36, U.N. Doc. A/8584 (1971). In an address to the United Nations
General Assembly on March 17, 1977, President Carter proclaimed that the United States
"will . . . seek to establish Soviet willingness to reach agreement . . . on mutual military
restraint in the Indian Ocean." N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1977, § 1, at 10, col. 4. The Soviet
response to this initiative was a willingness to open talks on the issue of establishing the
Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace." N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1977, at 4, col. 3.
12. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433.
13. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 729
U.N.T.S. 161, [19701 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839.
14. Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972,
United States-Soviet Union, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (expired Oct. 3, 1977);
see U.S. Intent with Regard to SALT I Interim Agreement, 77 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 642
(1977); Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-Soviet Union, [19721 23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
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in splendid isolation by a group of profound wise men whose overrid-
ing characteristic was foresight. The journeys of the early explorers,
the slaughter of the southern fur seal and the southern elephant
seal, the military skirmishes between territorial claimants, the
vague allusions to the inchoate claims of the United States and the
Soviet Union to the entire continent, the expansion of a permanent
Soviet presence in Antarctica, the novel experiment in cooperative
scientific research during the International Geophysical Year,' 5 and
many more pre-Treaty events are consigned to a sort of pre-history.
This perspective insufficiently emphasizes the extent to which fear
and suspicion rooted in events past and present, as much as hope
and vision for the future, motivated the concerned states to agree
on the Treaty. It was a settlement as well as an institutional blue-
print, in both respects deeply rooted in perceptions of rival inten-
tions'" as well as the potential for constructive and cooperative re-
straint.
What did the Treaty settle? To put it differently, who com-
promised what interests to achieve what benefits or to prevent what
potential adversities?
The territorial claims lie at the heart of the matter. Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United
Kingdom asserted territorial claims in Antarctica. Some of these
claims overlap.' 7 The territorial claims are based on a combination
of two different principles.' 8 The first is the classic principle of dis-
covery and occupation. The second is a principle of contiguity, ex-
pressed in polar regions as a "sector principle" under which sover-
eignty extends to the pole in the wedge formed by the outermost
meridians of longitude of occupied or "recognized" coastal territory.
An interesting nuance is the question of whether the territory from
which the lines extend must be in Antarctica, or whether they ex-
tend from the coasts of other (proximate?) continents and islands
that "face" Antarctica.'"
15. The International Geophysical Year was a nongovernmental project that collected a
broad spectrum of scientific data on the Antarctic continent. It involved the cooperative
efforts of scientists from 11 states. Mr. Alexander's article explores the significance of this
endeavor. See Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem, 33
U. MIAMI L. REv. 371, 377-79 (1978).
16. See generally The Antarctic Treaty: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
17. For a chart of the respective claims, see p. 297 infra.
18. Mr. Alexander's article discusses the legal bases of these claims. See Alexander,
supra note 15, at 381-94.
19. The question of the extent to which "permanent" ice, that does not overlie land
above sea level, is subject to sovereignty claims presents another interesting nuance. Is such
ice subject to the regime of the land, or the regime of the water, or some hybrid regime? Id.
at 384-85. This question has implications for other parts of the world. Since resolution of the
[Vol. 33:285
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The United States and the Soviet Union refused to recognize
any of these territorial claims. One may presume that other non-
claimants perceiving actual or potential interests in Antarctica
would probably refuse to recognize these territorial claims as well.
The nonrecognition position necessarily entails two legal conclu-
sions: (1) that no claim of sovereignty in Antarctica has been per-
fected under classic principles of discovery and effective occupation;
and (2) that a "sector principle" cannot be invoked to support
claims of sovereignty in Antarctica, at least where such claims
would extend sovereignty to Antarctica from other continents and
islands. 0
The crucial question is why there is no sovereignty under classic
principles. If the answer is that there has been no effective occupa-
tion; it is likely that with time the combination of expanding tech-
nology and expanding incentive would allow the perfection of sover-
eignty claims. It commits the nonrecognition position to eventual
extinction and encourages the states with inchoate claims to base
their Antarctic policy on perfection of these claims. An
"international" Antarctica is more than likely an intermediate pre-
sovereignty phase under this approach; the world is not at a stage
where states easily relinquish and internationalize recognized terri-
tory. However sincere an analytical conclusion might be that sover-
eignty claims are legally possible, but that a nonterritorial solution
is preferable, the probable effect of this conclusion would be to
prejudice the international solution.
The alternative position on nonrecognition is that Antarctica is
question is potentially significant in Antartica only if sovereignty (or arguably some other
type of geographic jurisdiction) over land (including ice-covered land) exists in the Antarctic,
the question might better be deferred. At the least, it might more usefully be addressed by
creative application of existing principles of international law of the sea, such as those regard-
ing elevations, baselines and artificial installations, rather than by attempting to introduce
new rules for deciding when frozen water is or is not water. Convention on the Continental
Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, art. 5(2)-(7);
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S.
205, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, arts. 3-11; Convention on the International Regula-
tions for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done Oct. 20, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 8587. The Informal
Composite Negotiating Text currently before the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea addresses these principles of international law. Informal Composite Negotiat-
ing Text, U.N. Doc. 8 A/CONF./62/W.P. 10, arts. 2-13, 47, 60, 80, 87, 121, 147, 259-63 (July
15, 1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNTJ.
There is a related question regarding the treatment of "occupied" ice-which could
include moving or "nonpermanent" ice. It might make sense to treat the confined ice station
or community as a ship or structure on the high seas. See United States v. Escamilla, 467
F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1972). Indeed, it might make sense to treat a confined Antarctic station
over land in the same way. See Hook, supra note 6, at 499-500.
20. Ambassador Zegers considers this question from a different perspective. See Zegers,
El Sistema Antdrctico y la Utilizaci6n de los Recursos, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 426, 458
(1978).
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not amenable to claims of sovereignty. The combination of Antarc-
tic characteristics is sufficiently distinct to ensure that any implica-
tion of prejudice to sovereignty claims outside Antarctica could eas-
ily be avoided. Two variants of this position are possible. Under the
first, one could argue that Antarctica (like the high seas) was never
amenable to sovereignty claims and that any change in that custom-
ary rule would be opposed. Alternately, one could argue that
whether or not sovereignty was theoretically possible, no claims
were perfected, and a new international status is now established
that precludes sovereignty, as on the moon and other celestial bod-
ies. 1
In principle, the Antarctic Treaty does not compromise either
the sovereignty claims or the nonrecognition positions. It expressly
preserves the positions of the claimants and the nonrecognition
states, serving the interests of both by prohibiting new claims or
expansion of existing claims." The provisions for arms control and
inspection," open access and cooperation in scientific research,2"
veto power over any proposed agreed measures for each Consultative
Party," restriction on who may become a Consultative Party," joint
environmental controls," and "sending state" jurisdiction over ob-
servers and scientific exchange personnel28 are all compatible with
either position. Thus, the basic Treaty settlement has three ele-
ments: (1) the claimants freeze the situation among themselves
where their claims overlap and need not take actions to protect their
claims, relying on both the juridical and demilitarization provi-
sions; (2) the claimants are assured by the provisions prohibiting
new claims and demilitarizing the area that the United States, the
Soviet Union and others will not make claims and that foreign activ-
ities in claimed areas will not prejudice existing claims; and (3)
personnel of the nonclaimants are assured access to the area unhin-
dered by "sovereignty" claims or military preemption.
This is not to suggest that community interests that transcend
the sovereignty question did not play an important role in the
21. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. II. As previously noted, the Antarctic
Treaty itself was once utilized as an example of the success of an international system for
dealing with remote areas. Its success probably facilitated the efforts to draft and gain
acceptance of the Outer Space Treaty. Accordingly, some may sense a certain irony in looking
to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as a model for Antarctica.
22. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV(2).
23. Id. arts. I & VII.
24. Id. arts. II & III.
25. Id. art. IX(4).
26. Id. art. IX(2).
27. Id. art. IV(1).
28. Id. art. VII(1).
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Treaty. Quite to the contrary, the common interest in conservation
and environmental protection necessitates international coopera-
tion to protect the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole. This in turn
enables advocates of restraint to moderate nationalistic sentiment.
It is likely that shared environmental concerns will increasingly
become the essential cement for international cooperation in Ant-
arctica.
Economic factors did not loom large in the negotiation of the
Antarctic Treaty. High seas freedoms and the activities of other
international organizations, both relevant to fishing, were expressly
protected.n While at least one claim to extended jurisdiction over
fisheries had already been made, it does not seem to have affected
the negotiations." There is evidence that the negotiators were aware
of potential issues arising out of natural resource exploitation, tour-
ism and other economic activity. The resolution of these issues,
however, presented difficulties in terms. of the competing sover-
eignty positions and was not considered essential in light of the
circumstances at that time.
Thus, the Treaty is "silent" on economic questions: while the
provisions of the Treaty on arms control, inspection, environmental
protection and other matters apply to all activities in Antarctica,
no express provision is made for the acquisition, exercise, allocation
or control of rights to exploit resources and to reap benefits from
such exploitation.
Resources, however, are now the key issue, and several new
factors are involved that deserve consideration. First, there is an
increased interest in the exploitation of Antarctic marine biological
stocks. Vast quantities of krill, a small, shrimp-like zooplankton,
have been discovered in Antarctic waters. Some estimate the avail-
able krill resource as two to three times the total world catch of
marine living resources.3 Experimental fishing has begun and has
resulted in very high yields. Squid and other living resources may
also be of interest.
Second, marine mammals in general, and whales in particular,
have become a symbol of international conservation and environ-
mental efforts.32 The Antarctic ecosystem supports the world's larg-
29. Id. arts. III(2) & VI.
30. In 1947, Chile proclaimed jurisdiction over a two hundred mile maritime zone appli-
cable to its Antarctic claim. Zegers, supra note 20, at 458; U.S. DkP'T OF STATE, No. 36,
NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION, LIMITS IN THE SEAS 17 (2d rev. Apr. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as LMITs IN THE SEAS].
31. TRAm TECH, INC., FINAL REPORT-THE ANrAcIC KRILL RESOURCE: PROSPECTS FOR
COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION (1978).
32. See, e.g., Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, done June 1, 1972,
T.I.A.S. No. 8826, reprinted in 11 INT'L L. MATERIALS 251 (1972); Marine Mammals Protection
1978)
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est stocks of baleen whales, which feed directly on krill. Moreover,
the decomposition of krill may be a significant factor in the extraor-
dinarily high nutrient content of Antarctic waters. Thus, the deter-
mination of the krill stock available for harvest implicates the ques-
tion of its effect on the maintenance and growth of whale stocks and
other species. 3
Third, the concept of a two hundred nautical mile fishing (or
economic) zone along the coast has achieved widespread acceptance
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea" and
has been implemented by a large number of coastal states.35 What
effect does this have on waters within two hundred miles of
Antarctica? Is establishment of such a zone a prohibited expansion
of an existing claim? Would attempts to enforce it against foreign
vessels violate the demilitarization provisions? How do states that
do not recognize territorial claims in Antarctica deal with the prob-
lem without prejudicing that position, since recognition of a coastal
state's jurisdiction in such a zone implies recognition of that state's
claim to the coastline from which the zone extends?
Fourth, the Antarctic marine ecosystem may be defined by the
Antarctic Convergence, an area of significant changes in tempera-
ture and salinity that circles the continent. While the Antarctic
Treaty applies south of latitude 600 S., the Antarctic Convergence
extends north of that latitude in places and embraces several islands
where sovereignty is uncontested." Thus, the Treaty line may not
be adequate for conservation measures designed to protect the eco-
system as a whole, while another line may pose new challenges for
the legal draftsmen.
Fifth, reports indicate a "good probability" of offshore oil or gas
in the continental shelf of Antarctica, although it is unclear whether
there are deposits of sufficient magnitude to be economically re-
coverable under the severe Antarctic conditions. 3 Technology for
Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-62, 1371-84, 1401-07 (1976).
33. Mr. Scully's article thoroughly describes the interrelationship between the delicate
food chain and the Antarctic species. See Scully, The Marine Living Resources of the South-
ern Ocean, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1978). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A POSSIBLE REGIME FOR CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC
LIVING MARINE RESOURCES (June 1978).
34. See ICNT, supra note 19, arts. 55-75.
35. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 30, passim.
36. See de Blij, supra note 4, at 300; Llano, supra note 5, at 358-59. A comparison of
the charts at p. 297 infra and in Scully, supra note 33, at 342, demonstrates the possible
extent of the Convergence, as well as the fact that islands of Australia, France and Norway
lie outside the Treaty area but within the Convergence.
37. Mr. Dugger's article provides a thorough discussion of research efforts and results,
as well as an analysis of present technological capabilities. See Dugger, Exploiting Antarctic
[Vol. 33:285
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Arctic oil and gas exploration and exploitation now being developed
may be directly relevant, although the enormity of Antarctic ice-
bergs is one of the additional complications. The possibility of ex-
ploration and exploitation raises difficult problems for the protec-
tion of the fragile Antarctic ecosystem. The question of jurisdiction
over continental shelf oil and gas poses problems of sovereignty and
recognition similar to those regarding the two hundred mile fishing
zone. " So long as the possibility of exploitation exists, however, it
may be one of the alternatives whose existence helps restrain oil
price increases.
Sixth, international affairs are increasingly dominated by de-
mands of developing countries for a new international economic
order.31 Primary emphasis is placed by them on questions of distri-
bution of wealth and collective control of economic power at pre-
cisely the same time that the United States is deemphasizing some
of these considerations as it embarks on a program of deregulation
domestically and seeks-as in the preamble of the new aviation
agreement with West Germany40-to establish the same goals inter-
nationally."
Mineral Resources: Technology, Economics, and the Environment, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 315
(1978).
38. The question of a prohibited expansion of existing claims is perhaps complicated by
the widespread acceptance of the legal concept of the continental shelf prior to 1959, and the
view that the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf exist ipso facto
and ab initio. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 22; Convention on the
Continental Shelf, supra note 19, art. 2; see Truman Proclamation, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303
(1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884; ICNT, supra note 19, art. 77.
39. Ambassador Pinto analyzes the issue of a regime for Antarctica from the perspective
of those urging a new international economic order. See Pinto, The International Community
and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (1978).
40. Paragraph three of the preamble states: "Desiring to promote an international avia-
tion system based on competition among airlines in the market place with minimum govern-
mental regulation." Protocol Relating to the Air Transport Agreement of 1955 [275 U.N.T.S.
3, [19561 7 U.S.T. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536, as amended Apr. 5, 1968, 697 U.N.T.S. 252,
[19681 19 U.S.T. 4402, T.I.A.S. No. 6434] Nov. 1, 1978, United States-Federal Republic of
Germany, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 410, Nov. 1, 1978.
41. One wonders whether the different perspectives regarding the desirable extent of
economic regulation are sufficient to prevent the emergence of a certain community of inter-
est between those who advocate universal rights of political participation and those who
advocate universal freedom of economic opportunity. This may depend on whether and when
the territorial claimants conclude that it is desirable to accommodate nonclaimant interests
within the framework of the Treaty.
The theoretical debate about regulation of Antarctic oil and gas exploitation will prob-
ably be attenuated to some degree because: (1) oil and gas producers generally require an
assurance of exclusive rights in a defined area before proceeding with intensive localized
activity necessitating substantial investments; (2) the allocation of the right to authorize and
control mining to some states might result in less efficient exploitation (or no exploitation)
despite market considerations; and (3) there exists a special need for extensive and continuing
environmental controls.
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Seventh, the increasing world demand for fresh water is creat-
ing interest in the enormous quantities of ice available in Antarc-
tica.4"
Eighth, not all states fishing or capable of conducting other
economic activities in Antarctica are parties to the Treaty, despite
its liberal accession provisions.'3 Moreover, "substantial scientific
research activity" is the sole Treaty criterion for becoming a
"Consultative Party" with a right to participate in the elaboration
and approval of "agreed measures" under the Treaty and in the
modification or amendment of the Treaty."
Finally, the prospect of increased human activity in Antarctica
gives added importance to the question of maintenance of law and
order. To the extent that an act such as murder, assault or theft
committed by an American civilian in Antarctica cannot be re-
garded as piracy on the high seas or in areas outside the jurisdiction
of any state," or as an offense committed on the high seas or on
board a vessel of the United States for purposes of the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 4 there is gen-
erally no federal court-and no foreign "territorial" court in the
view of the United States-that could try and punish that person
for the act.47
42. See de Blij, supra note 4, at 307.
43. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. X1i. In addition, some of the Treaty parties are
members of the European Economic Community. The Council of the European Communities
has conferred responsibility on the Commission of the European Communities with respect
to fishing rights of third countries in the fishing zones off the coasts of Community members
and the fishing rights of Community members in the waters off the coasts of other countries.
Council Resolution on Certain External Aspects of the Creation of a 200-mile Fishing Zone
in the Community, reprinted in 15 INT'L L. MATERIALS 1425 (1976) (effective from Jan. 1,
1977).
44. The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, supra note 32, was prepared
as a separate treaty, while various rules for the protection of Antarctic flora and fauna were
prepared by the Consultative Parties as agreed measures under Article IX of the Treaty. The
Antarctic Treaty attempts to deal with the nonparty problem by requiring the parties to exert
"appropriate efforts. . . to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary
to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty." Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, art. X
(emphasis added). Perhaps because of the specific protection of the rights "of any State under
international law with regard to the high seas within" the area to which the Treaty applies,
id. art. VI, as well as the practical and legal problems arising with any direct attempt to
implement Article X of the Treaty at sea, the separate treaty may be considered a preferable
means for dealing with Antarctic marine living resources.
45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-53 (1976); Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, arts. 14-22.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); S. 1437, 95th Cong., let Sess. § 203 (1977).
47. For a discussion of the present status of control over criminal conduct in Antarctica,
see Hook, supra note 6, at 494-95. In some cases the crime may be generally extraterritorial,
for example, where the object of the crime is the United States government itself or its
officials or property. Thus, certain criminal statutes may apply universally to American
citizens. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 662, 1114, 1751 (1976). The Uniform Code of Military
Justice may be adequate to deal with United States military personnel. 10 U.S.C. § 305
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There is nothing new about a scramble for wealth, a demand
for law and order, and programs for regulation and control following
upon the discovery of a new and valuable resource. But inflated
expectations can produce unnecessary discord. Eruption of sover-
eignty disputes could discourage economic activity; conversely, ac-
celerated economic activity could trigger such disputes. The extent,
if any, of new and valuable resources in Antarctica is unclear. Hy-
drocarbon deposits in Antarctica may not be economically exploita-
ble."8 Moreover, the environmental risks of hydrocarbon exploita-
tion, or the cost of minimizing those risks, may be unacceptable, at
least pending development of new technology. The extent of the krill
resource available for harvesting is also unclear. The environmental
questions posed raise problems going beyond conservation. Ulti-
mately, the question of "sharing" a primary food supply with other
creatures, particularly intelligent creatures that are not (or ought
not to be) exploited directly or indirectly by man, raises profound
ethical questions about the place of man in the natural order.
The question of sharing in potential benefits from economic
activities also bears closer examination. The more symbolic this
issue becomes, the more it may render territorialist and universal-
ist positions irreconcilable. All consumers generally benefit from
new supplies of a commodity, either directly or indirectly by re-
duced competition for other supplies. The number of persons, natu-
ral or juridical, willing and able to engage in living or mineral re-
source activities in Antarctica is severely limited by factors such as
training as well as cultural and climatic background. Even the most
ardent advocates of a new economic order may be skeptical about
the value of transferring Antarctic technology to tropical developing
countries-except, of course, from the perspective of one or two
tropical proto-industrial states. The extent of the economic rent
that could be derived by a sovereign or resource manager from the
allocation of resource rights will probably be seriously limited by the
high risk and cost of operations in Antarctica. As for refining, pro-
cessing, packing, support and similar activities, it would seem that
normal economic factors-including proximity, facilities, labor and
investment climate-are more likely to affect the result than the
"control" of the resource.
While the case for international cooperation and restraint is
considerable, it must be emphasized that the sovereignty problem
is critical. Demands by territorial claimants for a moratorium pend-
(1976). The proposed revision of title 18 of the United States Code elaborates various catego-
ries of extraterritorial offenses. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. § 204 (1977). A United States
state court may have residual extraterritorial jurisdiction provided such jurisdiction is not
preempted by statute or the Treaty.
48. Dugger, supra note 37, at 317-20.
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ing consent by each of them to an exploitation regime may be more
closely related to sovereignty considerations than to environmental
concerns. If their claims are recognized, the territorial claimants
may have little interest in a regime in Antarctica that gives rights
to nonclaimants or restrains the discretion of claimants. Nothing
approaching adequate international environmental controls or free
access for foreign scientists or observers exists in other areas where
states enjoy undisputed territorial sovereignty. Virtually every one
of the territorial claimants in Antarctica has recently engaged in a
degree of expropriation or regulation of private economic activity
that might not please "free market" advocates. If the territorial
claimants believe that others fear United Nations involvement in
Antarctica more than they, the incentive for accommodation may
be reduced. At the same time, it should be recognized that it would
be difficult for a territorial claimant to accept the possibility of
resource exploitation in a claimed area under any system to which
the claimant does not consent. For this reason, demands by terri-
torial claimants for a veto of some sort in the application of the
system are possible, even if this means according similar voting
rights to some nonclaimants.
In brief, the Antarctic Treaty was possible because states, in-
cluding the territorial claimants, had reason to believe that without
it their national interests might be prejudiced. It is submitted that
no such international system in Antarctica will remain likely unless
such concerns continue, particularly as attention is directed to mat-
ters that are not resolved in the Treaty. It is perhaps unfortunate
that this is so, but one wonders how else thoughtful and restrained
leaders could command national support for allegedly compromis-
ing "sovereignty" during a highly nationalistic period. Interestingly,
evidence of the determination of certain nonclaimants to remain in
Antarctica may presently be sufficient incentive for cooperation by
all concerned, just as it may have been the catalyst for the Antarctic
Treaty itself.
The University of Miami Law Review has assembled a diverse
and outstanding group of contributors to this symposium which it
is the author's honor to precede. Particular note should be made of
the wise decision to request that the contributors avoid discussion
of certain complex questions peripheral to the main purpose of this
symposium, notably the comparative merits of competing territorial
claims in Antarctica. Finally, while the expertise of the contributors
is self-evident, readers should be aware of the extraordinarily gra-
cious decisions of Ambassador Pinto of Sri Lanka, a member of the
International Law Commission, and Ambassador Zegers, Chile's
representative to recent Consultative Meetings under the Antarctic
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Treaty, to contribute to this symposium. Both are architects of the
"common heritage" principle in connection with the deep seabeds,
and have earned widespread international admiration while repre-
senting their countries and advocating the viewpoints of developing
countries at the United Nations and elsewhere for many years.
Stations and Claims
